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COURT OF APPEALS, 1960 TERM
FoRMIER OWNER OF REALTY LACKED STANDING TO APPLY FOR CANCELLATION

OF TAx SALE

A county treasurer shall not convey lands sold for taxes if he discovers that
the sale was invalid for any reason or ineffective to give title to the real
property sold. 68 If the defect is discovered after the conveyance, on application
of any person having an interest therein at the time of the sale, he shall cancel
the sale. 9
In Saxton v. Hose,70 the former owner sued the county treasurer to cancel
the sale. Special Term granted summary judgment dismissing the action for
failure to join the purchasers at the tax sale as necessary parties.71 The
Appellate Division affirmed, stating as an additional ground for affirmance that
the alleged defect, failure to designate a newspaper for publication of the notice
of sale, was a defect in the original levy of the tax and the period for contesting
72
the validity of the levy had expired.
In a per curiam decision, the Court of Appeals held that although a triable
issue was presented because the record did not contain evidence conclusively
establishing the purchasers to be necessary parties,73 and although the
alternative basis for decision relied upon in the Appellate Division was incorrect,
the order should be affirmed. Applying decisions under Section 40-c of the Tax
Law, identical to Section 40-c of the Suffolk County Tax Law here in question,
74
holding that only the purchaser at the tax sale had an interest in the property,
the Court held that only the purchaser could apply to cancel a defective sale.
Therefore, the former owner had no standing under the statute to apply for
cancellation.
Bd.
LEASE OF INCOMPETENT'S REAL PROPERTY MUST NOT BE MORE THAN FIvE

YEARS FROM THE EXECUTION DATE
The committee of an incompetent leased certain real property to the
defendant. The first five-year lease, to commence on the expiration of an
existing lease, May 1, 1955, was entered into on December 22, 1953 without
court approval. A second five-year lease, to commence on August 1, 1958, was
entered into on June 26, 1958 without court approval. The present action,
Vernon v. Sarra, Inc.,75 was instituted to have the leases declared invalid on the
ground that the termination dates of the leases were more than five years from
68. N.Y. Tax Law § 140 (now N.Y. Real Prop. Tax Law § 1026); Suffolk County
Tax Act § 40-c.
69.
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See People ex rel. Cooper v. Registrar of Arrears, 114 N.Y. 19, 20 N.E. 611
People ex rel. Staples v. Sohmer, 206 N.Y. 39, 99 N.E. 156 (1912); People ex rel.
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the execution dates in direct contravention to the New York Civil Practive
Act.76 Although there had been no cases construing the language of this
particular statute, the Supreme Court, relying on cases which had interpreted
similar language in other New York statutes, 77 held both leases invalid. 78 The
legislative purpose behind this statutory enactment was to safeguard the
incompetent's property from being leased for long terms, unless a responsible
neutral, the court, deemed it in the best interests of the incompetent. "No such
facile device to defeat the statute can be permitted as results from dividing
the tenancy into two or more leases, one for five years and the other to begin
in the future when the former one ends." 70 The Appellate Division affirmed
with no opinion, 0 and the Court of Appeals, citing only In re Trapasso Oldsmobile,8 1 affirmed.
Judges Burke and Froessel, concurring, held the first lease invalid on
grounds identical to those stated by the majority but would distinguish the
second from the first lease, the second being invalid for a totally different
reason. The first lease was entered into sixteen months prior to the expiration
of the then existing lease so that the effect of the leases was that the lessee
would remain in possession of the premises for six years, four months in direct
contravention of the statutory mandate. On the other hand, the second lease
was entered into thirty-five days prior to the commencement of a new five-year
term. By accepting the interpretation of the majority, the concurring judges
argued that all reasonable negotiations by the committee before the expiration
of an existing lease are thus forbidden by statute. This result is impractical
and unreasonable.
Even though the result may be impractical and unreasonable, it is
submitted that a five-year lease executed thirty-five days and one executed
sixteen months before the expiration of an existing agreement should not be
distinguished. Such a distinction on the basis of the necessity to allow a
reasonable time to negotiate a new lease is not called for by the statute and
would lead to countless litigation to determine what is a reasonable time for
negotiation. The solution would appear to be a four-year lease executed within
a year prior to the existing agreement, for any five-year lease executed prior to
76. N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 1377:
But a committee of the property cannot alien, mortgage, or otherwise dispose of
real property, except to lease it for a term not exceeding five years, without the
special direction of the court...
77. Application of Trapasso Oldsmobile, 2 A.D.2d 166, 153 N.Y.S.2d 793 (4th Dep't
1956) (Construing Section 21 of Membership Corporations Law); 39 Cortlandt Street
Corporation v. Lambert, 209 App. Div. 575, 205 N.Y. Supp. 161 (Ist Dep't 1924) (Construing Section 106 of New York Real Property Law). See also In re Trapasso Oldsmobile,
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21 Misc. 2d 747, 192 N.Y.S.2d 971 (Sup. Ct. 1959).
39 Cortlandt Street Corporation v. Lambert, supra note 77 at 580, 205 N.Y.S.
10 A.D.2d 696, 199 N.Y.S.2d 426 (Ist Dep't 1960).
Supra note 77.
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the date of actual commencement is clearly invalid under the majority's
interpretation of the statute.
The concurring judges found the second lease invalid because of the
inclusion in the lease of additional space occupied at the time of the execution
by another tenant, a point mentioned by neither the lower courts not the
majority. If the second lease had not attempted to lease additional space, it
would have been valid, the first lease being void ab initio; however, this was
not the case. The landlord-plaintiff, in order to secure an order of eviction
against the then occupying tenant, had to show "a bona fide offer to enter into
82
a lease with a prospective tenant . . . for a term of five years or more";
however, the lease, in order to comply with Section 1377 of the New York
Civil Practice Act, could not be for more than five years. In an effort to comply
with both statutes, the parties stipulated that the old lease in existence should
extend until the eviction of the occupying tenant, and that the new lease should
then commence and run for five years. Such a provision, as the concurring
judges held, is clearly violative of the five-year requirement of Section 1377,
and the entire lease, contingent on the provision, is invalid.
Bd.
INTERVIVOS GIFT OF STOcic REQUIRES TRANSFER PUOR To DONOR'S DEATH

In re Szabo's Estate once again raises the issue whether a decedent had
made a valid gift inter vivos to petitioner of stock assigned by decedent prior
to her death to petitioner and herself as joint tenants. 3 Decedent was the
owner of 122 shares of A.T. & T. stock. Upon being informed of a 3 for 1 split,
she executed an assignment to petitioner and herself on the back of a
certificate representing 50 shares. In addition, she directed her representative
to have the company place petitioner's name as joint tenant with right of
survivorship on all her shares. However, she also directed that the transfer
of the stock was not to be made until the new certificate resulting from the
split was available. Decedent died prior to that time and the transfer was
not made until after her death.
Petitioner proceeded under Section 206-a of the Surrogate's Court Act to
84
compel decedent's representative to turn over the certificate for 366 shares.
Had decedent made a valid inter vivos gift of any or all of the stock so that
petitioner was entitled to ownership as a surviving joint tenant? The Court
reiterated the old doctrine concerning the requisites for inter vivos gifts and
concluded that the element of sufficient delivery was missing.8 5 If the delivery
vests the donee with control and dominion over the property it is sufficient.8 6
In the case of stock certificates a symbolic delivery will suffice because as the
82.
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